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The Power Politics of Juvenile Court Transfer: A
Mildly Revisionist History of the 1990s
FranklinE. Zimring*
The boundary between the juvenile court's delinquency
jurisdiction and the adult criminal process should be an obvious
fault line in courts, academics, and state legislatures. What are and
what should be the differences in emphasis between a court for
seventeen-year-old burglars and a court that claims jurisdiction
over those with identical charges but earlier dates of birth?' The
discussion of what justifies separate treatment for adolescent
offenders should be an important and jurisprudentially thick
discourse, but it is not.
Regardless of the general age boundaries imposed by state
legislation between juvenile and criminal court, special
proceedings are available to transfer youth under the usual age
threshold from juvenile to criminal court.2 Even if general rules
such as maximum jurisdictional age are rarely influenced by
extensive analysis, surely these exceptional cases where a youth
might be removed from juvenile court present the sort of highstakes individual dramas that provoke deep thought and require
resort to the basics of legal philosophy, to a search for
fundamentals. Standards for transfer should inspire detailed
legislative debate about the purposes and limits of juvenile courts.
Judicial decisions about waiver from juvenile to criminal court
should be thoughtful, meticulous, and impartial. Appellate review
of judicial-waiver decisions should be one of the major intellectual
challenges of a state appeals court career. Transfer, however, is a
jurisprudential wasteland. The gap between theory and practice in
transfer decision-making is huge at every branch of state
government, and the poverty of judicial performance in waiver
decisions and appeals is a particular disappointment. Why? What is
there about the jurisprudential issues raised by waiver that
produces legislative and judicial underperformance?
Part of the problem was a disingenuous theory of waiver in the
original juvenile court, which has been exacerbated by political
debates where transfer policy is generally a crude surrogate for
Copyright 2010, by FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING.
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support or opposition to juvenile courts. For the entire existence of
the juvenile court, the waiver of some serious cases into a criminal
court has been a practice in search of a theory. The problem
initially was not the absence of a prominent rationale for a separate
juvenile court but rather the embrace of an implausible cover story
that only justified rejecting the delinquent if he was not a fit
subject for rehabilitation. Therefore, the task of the juvenile court
judge was to determine if the subject of the petition was "amenable
to treatment."3
From the beginning, an emphasis on amenability did not sound
plausible because there were few or no treatment programs
administered by early juvenile courts.4 To be sure, repeated failure
on probation and in custody was predictive of transfer to criminal
court, but the tone of the discussion in such cases sounded much
more like contempt of court than any more complex assessment of
amenability.5 Two elements of cases that have no direct bearing on
amenability to specialized treatment have been important in
predicting transfer-the advanced age of the juvenile and the
seriousness of the charge.6 Joel Eigen found that juveniles accused
of homicide were 25 times as likely to be transferred in
Philadelphia as those charged with robbery. Why were robbers so
much more amenable to treatment?
This first great credibility gap in transfer jurisprudence was
rich in potential for misrepresentation. 8 The juvenile court judge
was supposed to inquire about whether the subject of the hearing
3. ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 162.
4. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 36-39 (2005).
5. Joel Eigen, Punishing Youth Homicide Offenders in Philadelphia,72 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1072, 1091 (1981).
6. ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 109, 111 (noting that age and seriousness
have been particularly influential in transfer decisions); see also Robert Dawson,
An EmpiricalStudy of Kent Style Juvenile Transfers to Criminal Court, 23 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 975 (1992); Eigen, supra note 5, at 1077.
7. ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 110 (citing Joel Eigen, The Determinantsand
Impact ofJurisdictionalTransfer in Philadelphia,in MAJOR ISSUES INJUVENILE
JUSTICE INFORMATION AND TRAINING: READINGS IN PUBLIC POLICY 333, 337,
341 (John C. Hall et al. eds., 1981); Joel Eigen, The Borderlands of Juvenile
Justice: The Waiver Process in Philadelphia (Jan. 1, 1977) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Pennsylvania) (on file with Penn Libraries, University
of Pennsylvania)). This 25-to-i ratio is calculated using two pieces of data
collected by Eigen-first, about half of all juvenile homicide arrests were
waived to adult court, while around 2% of all robbery cases were waived to
adult jurisdiction. Hence, Eigen found that juveniles accused of homicide were
25 times more likely to be transferred to adult court than robbery suspects in
Philadelphia.
8. See Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring, Editors' Introduction to THE
CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 1, 4-6.
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was "mature," but the reward for this status might be eligibility for
capital punishment! 9
The problematic nature of non-amenability to treatment as a
justification for waiver may help explain the lack of probing
analysis in judicial opinions about transfer from juvenile to
criminal court. The obvious inconsistencies in the conceptual
schema can generate feelings of insecurity about allowing deep
inquiry into the foundations of transfer policy. If the underpinnings
of transfer policy do not make sense, then covering transfer
discussions with huge grants of discretion to the decision-maker is
one natural strategy to avoid confronting fundamental
inconsistencies.
There is a second reason why discourse about transfer rarely
displays depth or subtlety-the crude preferences that animate the
actions of most participants in the process. Attitudes toward
transfer seem to come in only two conclusory varieties. Friends of
the juvenile court believe that all waiver is problematic and display
zero tolerance for theories about its potential value.10 Conversely,
critics who label the juvenile court as soft on crime prefer
maximum authority to transfer offenders into what is regarded as a
more appropriately punitive criminal court." This, however,
transforms a debate about transfer into a referendum on the whole
of the juvenile court rather than an exceptional outcome reserved
for special cases.
The crude and mislabeled nature of discourse about transfer
makes the identification of the reasons for policy changes difficult
to identify. This Article seeks to determine the major reasons for
legislative change on transfer in the last decade of the twentieth
century. Identifying the central motives behind the shifts in the
1990s helps to create more effective strategies for protecting
modem juvenile courts from corruption of their mission.
Misidentifying the real motives of legislative change can provoke
well-intentioned people to make disastrous mistakes.

In the 1990s, many states passed legislation designed to
increase the number of cases that could be transferred from
9. ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 164 (noting that the perceived level of
maturity of an offender plays an important role in determining whether juvenile
jurisdiction is appropriate).
10. See Franklin E. Zimring & Jeffrey Fagan, Transfer Policy and Law
Reform, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 407,
408-10.
11. Id.
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juvenile court and to change the allocation of authority between
judge and prosecutor in making transfer decisions.' 2 The media
often portrayed this increase in legislative activity as a response to
the increase in youth homicide in urban areas.' 3 To the extent that
there was a mandate for change implied in this new legislation, it
was a tiphtening up of punishment policy towards youth
violence.' It was unclear, however, how broad that mandate was
or to what degree dissatisfaction with priorities and processes of
juvenile courts played a role in the legislation. Was the legislative
barrage of the 1990s the opening wave of an attempt to profoundly
alter the power and jurisdiction of juvenile courts? If so, were
attempts to maintain the reach of juvenile courts by changing their
policies appropriate or successful?
There were two important contrasts between juvenile and
criminal courts in the United States of the 1990s. The first was a
difference in the level of secure confinement imposed on
offenders, with the criminal courts much more punitive than the
juvenile courts.15 The second was a substantially different
allocation of power between judges and prosecutors-criminal
courts were run by a plea-bargaining dynamic which gave
prosecutors much more power than judges, while juvenile courts
conferred much more power on judges and probation staff.16
This Article argues that the most important struggle during the
1990s was not about the jurisdiction of juvenile courts-or even
about the content of punishment policy for young offenders-but
rather was an attempt to expand prosecutorial power in juvenile
justice. This Article also shows that confusion among supporters of
the juvenile court about the nature of the threat to juvenile justice
produced one defensive strategy-the so-called "blended
jurisdiction"-that facilitated rather than deflected the major threat
to the integrity and authority of the juvenile courts in the United
States.

12. HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, NAT'L CTR. FOR JUVENILE
JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: A NATIONAL REPORT 154 (1995);
ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 11-15.

13. ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 11-15, 31-47.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 169 (discussing the punishment gap between juvenile and adult
jurisdictions).
16. Id. at 109.
17. Id. at 169-72.
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I. DIMENSIONS OF DIFFERENCE
Generally, the juvenile-court jurisdiction ends with the 13 to 17
year old age group. In this age group, approximately 489 persons
per 100,000 males are in secure confinement.' 8 This number
increases to 2,642 persons per 100,000 males for the 18 to 24 year
old age group where criminal courts provide exclusive jurisdiction.1 9
The male incarceration rate for ages 18 to 24 is not available
separately for jail and prison for each year in the age category. The
aggregate rate for 18 to 24 year olds is more than five times the
confinement rate in ages 13 to 17. The confinement or
incarceration rate for the oldest groups under the age of 18 is
17 and 18
946,20 so the comparison at the age boundary between
year olds is probably much closer than five to one. 2 1 The 18 to 24
year old incarceration rate grew rapidly in the last three decades of
the twentieth century,22 so there was reason to believe that juvenile
courts were less likely than criminal courts to increase
incarceration rates.
While the large gap between juvenile and adult incarceration
rates might be a product of either smaller percentages of juveniles
receiving custody, or shorter custodial stays, the substantial "front
loading" of the juvenile system with detention suggests that much
of the difference in aggregate incarceration populations is a result
of shorter stays for the younger groups. If the ratio of prisoners-tojail inmates on any given day is more than two-to-one in the 18 to
24 year old group, this ratio is much higher than the ratio of postadjudication confinement-to-detention in the juvenile system. The
most probable contrast between juvenile and criminal courts is a
large number of short stays at the front end of the juvenile court as
opposed to much higher rates of post-adjudication imprisonment in
the criminal court.
18. Census ofJuveniles in Residential PlacementDatabook, OFF. JUV. JUST.
& DELINQ. PREVENTION, http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/Cjrp (last updated Apr.

14, 2008).
19.

See HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE

STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2007 (2008), available at http://www.realcostof
prisons.org/materials/BJS_2007 PrisonStatistics.pdf. See also infra Figure 1
for an explanation of the methodology used.
20. The phrase "the oldest group under 18" refers to the incarceration rate
of the oldest age group within the 13 to 17 age range. Hence, the incarceration
or confinement rate of this smaller subgroup is 946 persons per 100,000.
21. See Census ofJuveniles in ResidentialPlacementDatabook,supranote 18.
22. ZIMRING, supra note 4, at 46 fig.4.1.
23. See ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 169 (noting that there is a penalty gap
between the juvenile and adult systems whereby juveniles often receive shorter

confinements).
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There is no doubt that the juvenile court's reputation for
relative leniency played a major role in the legislative politics of
the 1990s and that public fear of juvenile violence was a major
element in legal change.24 But there are two different strategies for
increasing severity that could be adopted to close any so-called
"leniency gap" between juvenile and criminal courts. One method
would be to push cases that would otherwise be handled in juvenile
courts into the criminal courts, where harsher policies are already
in place. A second method would be to increase the penalties and
punishment priorities in the juvenile court to bring the values
closer to those of criminal courts. These two separate threats to the
traditional priorities of juvenile justice might both be pushed by the
same actors at the same time. To the extent that one threat is larger
than the other, they call for different strategies of legal response in
the juvenile court and by its traditional supporters.
The most visible form of legislative change in the 1990s came
with changes to the standards and procedures for transfer of serious
crimes to criminal courts.25 The longstanding method of transfer
was a hearing held before a juvenile court judge who had the
power to waive the juvenile court's jurisdiction. This "waiver"
would allow the prosecutor to bring a charge in criminal court.27
Much of the legislation during the 1990s was designed to increase
the number of charges and of juveniles eligible for judicial waiver
by reducing the minimum age for waiver, by increasing the
charges that could provide a threshold for transfer, or by changing
the burden of proof for judicial decision to waive.2 8 Two other
methods of increasing transfers were also frequently proposed and
passed. The first was legislation that provided original jurisdiction
in criminal courts for particular charges brought against older
juveniles. 29 The second was an explicit grant of discretionary
power to prosecutors to file in either juvenile or criminal court at
their discretion. 30
The heavy emphasis on transfer legislation might have created
the impression that a major priority of the legal change was to
reduce the jurisdiction and power of juvenile courts. In fact, the
emphasis on murder cases as the source of public concern required
a focus on waiver because killings had always been the leading
24. Id. at 9 (noting that the perception that some juveniles go unpunished
influences media coverage and legislative priorities).
25. SNYDER & SICKMUND,supra note 12, at 154.
26. ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 109.
27.

Id.

28.
29.
30.

Id. at 117-21.
Id.
Id.
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case for transfer to the much higher maximum penalties in the
criminal system. 3 1 Any set of juvenile court proposals driven by
murder cases would emphasize transfer even if the proponents
were not seeking to limit the jurisdiction of juvenile courts.
Further, while the penal outcomes for murder in criminal courts are
vastly higher than in juvenile courts, the number of homicide
cases indeed the total number of transfers in most systems, is
tiny. Only mass transfer structures such as those used in Florida
and New York really cut into juvenile court jurisdiction in serious
cases, and neither of these radical reforms came in the 1990s.33
Despite the emphasis on transfer in the 1990s, there were none of
the wholesale cutbacks that had been produced in the 1970s in
New York and the 1980s in Florida. 34
II. THE DOG THAT DIDN'T BARK

Moreover, there was one other proposal significantly missing
from the legislative record of the 1990s. The easiest way to alter
the boundaries between juvenile and criminal courts is to alter the
jurisdictional age that separates the two systems. There is wide
variation already among the 50 states about the dividing line
between juvenile and criminal court. Thirty-eight states extend the
jurisdiction of juvenile courts to the eighteenth birthday while two
states make the age transition at 16.3 Because the rate of serious
crime increases with each year in the mid-teens, there are greater
numbers of homicide, assault, burglary, and robbery arrests
between these two birthdays than in the rest of the juvenile

31. See, e.g., id. at 114 (noting that Texas, for instance, had a significant
contrast between waiver of juvenile homicide cases and all other offenses); see
also id. at 110 (describing the difference in waivers between juvenile homicide
cases and juvenile robbery cases).
32. Id. at 112-13.
33. Id. at 16.
34. Id. at 15-16.
35. Current 2009 distribution of states by maximum age for delinquency: (age
15) Connecticut, New York, North Carolina; (age 16) Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, South Carolina, Texas,
Wisconsin; (age 17) Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming. See Statistical Briefing Book: Statutes,
CRIM. JUST. REFERENCE SERVICE, http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/structure_
process/qa04 101 .asp?qaDate=2007 (last visited July 31, 2010).
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population. 36 This means that a simple reduction of two years in
the jurisdictional age would remove a majority of serious juvenile
cases to the criminal courts in states that use the age of 18 as a
transition. Yet while 40 states made waiver or transfer easier in the
early 1990s, 37 no American state cut back the maximum age of
delinquency by two years,3 8 and only two states lowered the
maximum age from 18 to 17. Clearly, the natural and simple
method of expanding criminal court powers by reducing the
caseload in juvenile court was never a part of the legislative
agenda of the 1990s.
The absence of a major emphasis on reduction of jurisdiction
means that the 1990s should not be seen as a turf battle between
juvenile and criminal courts. But why then the proliferation of
transfer legislation and the concentrated effort on the organization
and boundaries of juvenile courts? Part of the emphasis on transfer
might have been simply an attempt to do something punitive about
youth violence without shifting resources or making major
institutional alterations. But why multiple layers of legal change,
and why were the laws so complex? One plausible explanation for
both the form and content of the 1990s brand of "get tough"
legislation is to regard it as an attempt to provide greater power to
prosecutors within juvenile courts, to push the allocation of power
in juvenile courts closer to the model of prosecutorial domination
that has been characteristic of criminal courts in the U.S. for a
generation.
A central mechanism of case disposition in criminal courts is
plea-bargaining, and the vast majority of the power to determine
punishment in plea-bargaining rests with the prosecutor. 40 The
judge enters the legal process after the punishment determination
in negotiated cases, which is the essence of what Morris and
Hawkins called "[a]n administrative law of crime." 4 1 The contrast
in juvenile court is substantial for institutional as well as historical
reasons. Prosecutors are one of three powerful institutional
presences inside the modem juvenile court.4 Juvenile court judges
and referees, alone and in collaboration with probation staff,
36. Crime in the United States 2008: Table 38, FBI.Gov, http://www2.fbi.
gov/ucr/cius2008/data/table_38.html (last updated Sept. 2009).
37. ZIMRING, supranote 1, at 13 (citing SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 12).
38. StatisticalBriefing Book: Statutes, supra note 35.
39. Id.
40. See generally Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea
Bargaining,36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50 (1968).
41. NoRVAL MORRIS & GORDON HAWKINS, LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT ON
CRIME CONTROL 15 (1977).
42. ZIMRING, supranote 1, at 109-10.
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exercise power over detention decisions.4 3 They also have power
over whether a petition will be filed in a case, whether a juvenile
will be diverted, and what type of post-adjudication placement will
be selected if the juvenile is adjudicated delinquent.4 Both
probation and judges are more influential in juvenile than in
criminal courts. While prosecutors are much more powerful in
juvenile courts than they were a generation ago, they are still less
powerful in juvenile than in criminal courts, and this is the
comparison that carries the most contemporary meaning to the
modem prosecutor.
The shift from judicial waiver to discretionary or direct filing
resulted in more power and less work for juvenile court
prosecutors. The standard method of transfer in the twentiethcentury juvenile court was a hearing where the prosecutor
attempted to persuade the juvenile court judge to transfer a juvenile
within the court's jurisdiction.4 5 This type of waiver hearing is
hard work for prosecutors, and while the success rate of such
motions is about 80%, the risk of failure is nontrivial.4 6 Providing
discretion to prosecutors to file in either juvenile or criminal courts
is an obvious and direct shift of power from juvenile court judges
to prosecutors. Providing exclusive jurisdiction for some charges
in criminal court is a less obvious grant of power to prosecutors but
no less direct, because it is the prosecutor who determines what
charges to file. 47 If murder charges go directly to criminal court but
manslaughter may be tried in juvenile court, the selection of the
charge becomes the selection of the court. The proliferation of
direct file provisions is really an enhancement of prosecutorial
power as much as it is a legislative judgment about which juveniles
should be transferred to criminal court because it is contingent on
prosecutorial charging discretions. A shift from judicial waiver to
direct file not only increases the power of prosecutors, it also
decreases the workload necessary to produce a waiver outcome.
All of this might also enhance the power of prosecutors to bargain
with defense attorneys in the very early stages of cases that might
end up in juvenile or criminal courts and secure concessions in
exchange for reduction of charges.

43. Id.
44. Margaret K. Rosenheim, The Modern American Juvenile Court, in A
CENTURY OF JUVENLE JUSTICE 341, 348-51 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds.,
2002).
45. ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 109.
46. Dawson, supra note 6.
47. See generally ZIMRING, supranote 1, at 125-27.
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III. THE POWER POLITICS OF CALIFORNIA'S PROPOSITION 21

Searching for the true motives behind legislation is consistently
something of a guessing game, and the incentives in the area of
crime policy are always to represent public safety as the major
reason for any proposed change in policy. This means that
determining the real priorities in legal change is often difficult.
However, at the close of the 1990s, a series of proposals drafted for
Republican legislators by prosecutors48 were packaged into a
thirty-four-part initiative put on the California ballot for March of
2000 as Proposition 21 and passed by the voters.4 9 This complex
structure provides a fascinating window into the priorities of the
most detailed "get tough" agenda of the era.
The seventeen separate changes in juvenile court legislation at
the back end of Proposition 21 are a complicated attempt to
leverage the powers of prosecutors at the expense of probation and
judicial power.5 0 The long list of changes include the usual
candidates for juveniles in the 1990s-a new list of direct file
categories and specific provisions making judicial waiver easier for
prosecutors by expanding the list of crimes that generate a
of transfer and reducing the burden of proof in the
presumption
.
.
*51
judicial proceeding.
The complicated menu of changes, however, includes two
more obvious assaults on the power of other court offices. The first
was phrased as a prohibition of release by probation staff if a
juvenile over the age of 14 had been charged with one of a series
of felonies.5 2 Typically in California, initial detention decisions
were made by probation staff (as is intake screening), and a
judicial officer then reviewed the case when detention was
elected.5 3 Prior to Proposition 21, release by probation was
prohibited only if a minor over the age of 14 had personally used a
gun. Section 20 expanded this ban to a long list of charges. 54 This
48. There is some controversy as to which prosecutors' offices had the
major role. Lisa Green, then of the Los Angeles Public Defender's Office
attributed most of the juvenile sections to the Los Angeles District Attorney,
while other oral historians implicated Riverside.
49. See California Law Tougher for Juveniles Now, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Mar. 9, 2000, at 13A.
50. Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of Law Professors & Juvenile Justice
Specialists in Support of Petitioners Morgan Victor Manduley et al. at 2,
Manduley v. Super. Ct. of San Diego Cnty., 41 P.3d 3 (Cal. 2002) (No.
S095992) [hereinafter Amicus Briefj (on file with author).
51. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707 (West Supp. 2009).
52. Id. § 625.3 (West 2008).
53. Amicus Brief, supra note 50, at 4.
54. Id.
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unprincipled expansion shifted the initial detention decision from
probation to the prosecutor in a large number of cases because the
prosecutor can select a charge that removes the probation staff's
authority under the new statutory provision.
An even more visible power play was the two separate sections
of Proposition 21 that deal with pretrial diversion programs of
juveniles. One provision in Proposition 21, section 22, abolishes
eligibility for a diversion program previously authorized by law
that was administered by probation and the judiciary if a minor
over the age of fourteen is charged with any felony." But a second
section of Proposition 21, section 29, without mentioning the
diversion program that Proposition 21 has just trivialized, creates a
new pretrial diversion pro am to be administered in the juvenile
court by the prosecutor. Here is the smoking gun of the
proposition's real agenda. There is no theory of diversion that can
explain why Proposition 21 both abolishes and introduces a pretrial
diversion program. The only principle that accommodates both of
these results is the positive value of prosecutorial power. What
emerges from a careful reading of Proposition 21 is a zero-sum
contest between prosecutors and other court personnel for the
power to determine juvenile court policy.
Proposition 21 is representative of much, if not most, of the
legislative legacy of the 1990s. The most parsimonious explanation
of why so little jurisdiction was shifted from juvenile to criminal
court is that those pushing for the new laws were not committed to
reducing the importance or power of the juvenile court; they were
instead interested in changing the power relations inside the
juvenile court and the punitive priorities of the court. Increased
prosecutorial power and harsher sanctions were desired, and there
was an assumption that larger prosecutorial power would achieve
more punitive outcomes. But which was the more important
objective? For those who drafted specifics of the legislation
(prosecutors themselves), it is hard to resist the conclusion that
prosecutorial power was the higher priority.
Critics of the 1990s legislative frenzy were about half right in
their diagnosis of what was happening. My conclusion in 1998 was
as follows:
If the reforms of the past decade are typical of future
trends, it is the mission of the juvenile court rather than its
jurisdiction that is at risk. The goal of punitive reforms has
been to reorient the juvenile court rather than to cut back on
55. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 654.3.
56. Id. §§ 790-95.
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its size, its influence, or its power. For those who support
the traditional missions of juvenile justice, the biggest
worry will be not the decline in power of the juvenile court
that a powerful juvenile justice system
but the new policies
57
may soon serve.
Why only half right? While much of the rhetoric of this
paragraph wears pretty well, it also displays a regrettable failure to
identify the growth of prosecutorial power as central to the threat.
It was not impossible that the traditional focus of juvenile courts
on limiting punishment and serving youth development could be
undone by a punitive turn in the outlook of all the powerful actors
in juvenile justice, but this was always unlikely. Juvenile court
judges and probation officers will not place their faith in
unqualified crime suppression. The greater danger is the shift of
power within the juvenile courts from the judges and probation
staff who have been the bulwark of the juvenile court tradition to a
regime of prosecutorial hegemony.
With the wisdom of hindsight, this Article now suggests that
the largest threat to enlightened delinquency policy has always
been a shift of power rather than a change of heart. Prosecutors are
already a powerful presence in juvenile justice, but they are not the
sole determiners of juvenile justice sanctions. 59 The danger of
shifts like Proposition 21 is the transfer of sentencing powers-the
power to detain, the power to divert, and the power to transfer-to
prosecutors alone.60 Attention to these allocation-of-power issues
should be the most prominent part of analyses of law reform
throughout the domains of juvenile court policy.
In the section that follows, this Article revisits one set of law
reform activities during the 1990s where both the problem
addressed and the solutions adopted were dangerously innocent of
this perspective.

57. ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 16.
58. Id. at 169 (stating that the longer duration of penal confinement for
juvenile offenders is inconsistent with the premise and philosophy of juvenile
court).
59. Amicus Brief, supra note 50, at 4 (describing the importance of the
hearing conducted before a juvenile judge before Proposition 21).
60. Id. at 4 (detailing that section 18 of Proposition 21 would shift the
ultimate power to make transfer decisions to the prosecutor, who would have
"unreviewable discretion to select charges").
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IV. THE STRATEGIC FOLLY OF BLENDED JURISDICTION
One response to the pressure for new approaches to juvenile
violence was the creation of a special new unit within juvenile
courts that would have the power to impose much longer-thanusual sentences and frequently would also provide more procedural
protections when conducting trials. 6 1 Redding and Howell describe
the appeal of what is called the "blended" model in the following
terms:
[B]lended sentencing is an extension of the ideals of the
juvenile court, allowing the court to maintain its
jurisdiction over serious and violent juvenile offenders
rather than having them transferred to criminal court and
incarcerated in adult facilities. Blended sentencing is
appealing to many juvenile justice officials, prosecutors,
and defense attorneys, because it preserves juvenile court
jurisdiction and discretionary control .. . while providing a
stronger accountability sanction and greater community
protection ..

.

2.

In my view, the basic assumptions of blended jurisdiction are
wrong and the extreme versions of the system (such as Texas) are
monstrous,63 but the merits of blended jurisdiction are not the point
of this Article. Instead, adventures of the 1990s with blended
jurisdiction will illustrate rather clearly why it is dangerous to
design responses to assaults on American juvenile courts without a
clear notion of what is motivating the attack.
What made blended sentencing appealing to many juvenile
justice officials was the notion that expanding the punishment
powers available in juvenile courts would mollify critics who were
attempting to cut back on the jurisdiction and influence of the
juvenile court." The problem here is that nobody was really trying
to cut back on the court's jurisdiction-there were no crusades to
transfer older juveniles out of the court. There was only the attempt
to make transfer easier in a few cases when huge penalties were

61.
62.

See ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 169-74.
Richard E. Redding & James C. Howell, Blended Sentencing in

American Juvenile Courts, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE,

supra note 2, at 145, 147.
63. ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 169-74.
64. Redding & Howell, supra note 62, at 170 (stating that blended
jurisdiction and hybrid proceedings "are a substitute for transfer to criminal
court" in many cases).
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available as a consequence. 6 The blended system was designed to
respond to a non-existent threat. In those cases where prosecutors
wanted the huge adult system penalties, there were usually no
provisions in the blended sentencing laws to make transfer

unavailable. 66
But what if the real agenda was to reorient the juvenile court's
sanctions and priorities? What if "it is the mission of the juvenile
court rather than its jurisdiction that is at risk"? 67 If the
enhancement of prosecutorial power was sought and pleabargaining was encouraged, then blended sentencing is just what
the district attorney ordered. Once blended sentences become an
alternative to transfer for the same juvenile (a standard condition),
the district attorney offers a reduction to the blended jurisdiction if
the juvenile will plead guilty in that setting. Where the blended
alternative is also used as a step up from the punishment grade in
regular delinquency cases, the juvenile will be choosing between a
plea in the regular court or a trial in the blended tribunal. In each
case, the punishment will often be determined before a judge
arrives on scene.
The strategic choice argument this Article makes is that
misreading the real agenda of the 1990s created a catastrophic
error in response from many in juvenile justice. If the real danger
had been the decline of court jurisdiction, then blended
sentencing's expansion of punishment power might have been a
remedy worth discussion. If prosecutorial power and punitive
priority were the goals of the right in the 1990s, then blended
sentencing was nothing short of surrender. Those who hoped to
hold on to a few cases otherwise headed for criminal court by
sacrificing judicial power and limited punishment system-wide
would celebrate a victory only General Pyrrhus could fully
appreciate.

65. Id. at 171 (describing how even systems that made blended jurisdiction
available still provided transfer for extremely serious juvenile violence).
66. ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 169-174.
67. Id. at 16.
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Figure 1
Secure Confinement per 100,000 males for 13 to 17 year olds
and 18 to 24 year olds U.S., 2006-2007
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* based on 231,600 in prison, BJS prisoners in 2007, and assuming the same ratio of
jail to prison for 18-24 as for all ages, .42 times the 331,600 males, or 100,199. For
jail to prison ratios, compare BJS prisoners in 2007 with BJS Jail Inmates at midyear 2007, both at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs. The census population is estimated
at 12,588 by taking two-fifths of the 15 to 19 total of 10,747,000 males and adding
this to the 10,409,000 for ages 20 to 24. U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population
Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement, 2007, table 1.

Sources: Sicknund, Melissa, TJ, Sladkey and Wei Kong (2008). "Census of
Juveniles in Residential Placement Databook," available at http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/
ojstatbb/cjrp/, 18-24, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisoners in 2007 and Jail Inmates
at mid-year 2007 in notes to 18-24 estimate.

